Computer Ethics

James Moor, Just Consequentialism and Computing

Christopher L. Holland

Saint Louis University

September 26, 2024

Consequentialism,
Deontology and
Just Consequentialism

Consequentialism

• consequences alone determine moral right and wrong
• moral imperatives are hypothetical imperatives
• the good is prior to the right

Deontological Ethics

• consequences alone do not determine moral right and wrong
• at least some moral obligations are unconditional/categorical
• at least some moral imperatives are categorical imperatives
• the right is prior to the good

Just Consequentialism

• An attempt to blend the consequentialist and deontological approaches
• the right/just constrains the good
• Moral rules are policies

Moral Rules as Policies

• Policies are “rules of conduct ranging from formal laws to informal, implicit guidelines for action” (Moor 1999, 65).
• As policies, moral rules have pro tanto force
  • there can be justified exemptions (not absolute rules)
  • they are otherwise obligatory (not mere suggestions)

Moor asks us to think of actions as policy tokens. “Every action can be considered as an instance of a policy – in this kind of situation such and such action is allowed or required or forbidden.”

Policies are not absolute rules. Policies are not not mere suggestions.

The word “policy” is intended to suggest both that there can be justified exemptions (policies are not absolute rules) and a level of obligation (policies are not mere suggestions). (Moor 1999, 65)

Moral Rules as Policies

• Policies make certain actions pro tanto
  • allowed (permissible)
  • required (obligatory)
  • forbidden (impermissible)
• Moral Policies are
  • impartial (deontic element)
  • more beneficial than their alternatives (consequentialist element)¹

1. Moor does not think that we are ethically required to select policies with the best possible outcomes.

Consequentialist Elements

Core Goods

• Life
• Happiness¹
• Autonomy

Moor notes that different people will assign different weights to each.

1. By “happiness” Moor means “pleasure and the absence of pain.”

Core Evils

• Death
• Unhappiness
• Lack of Autonomy

Moor on Autonomy (ASK FOR)

The goods of autonomy are just the goods we would ask for in order to complete our projects. (Moor 1999, 66)

• Ability
• Security
• Knowledge
• Freedom
• Opportunity
• Resources

Deontic Elements

Just policies (based on work by Bernard Gert)

• Just polices are impartial policies: “it is unjust is for someone to use a kind of policy that he would not allow others to use” (Moor 1999, 66–67).
• The impartiality test can also be use to evaluate potential policy exceptions. (What would follow if we allowed everyone with in a similar circumstance to violate the policy?)

• Abstract the essential features of the situation using morally relevant features.
• Ask whether the resulting rule so modified could be publicly allowed.

Two part impartiality test:

Gert applies his account of impartiality to potential violations of moral rules. This is a two step procedure in which one abstracts the essential features of the situation using morally relevant features and then asks whether the resulting rule so modified could be publicly allowed, i.e., what consequences would follow if everyone knew about this kind of violation and could do it.

Blindfold of justice:

The blindfold removes all knowledge of who will benefit or will be harmed by one’s choices. This is similar to John Rawls’ veil of ignorance5 except that Gert allows those who are blindfolded to assign different weights to the benefits and harms. As a result there is room for disagreement that is not permitted in Rawls’ account. Not all rational, impartial people will agree on every judgment. … If the blindfold of justice is applied to computing policies, some policies will be regarded as unjust by all rational, impartial people, some policies will be regarded as just by all rational, impartial people, and some will be in dispute. This approach is good enough to provide just constraints on consequentialism.

— Moor, “Just Consequentialism and Computing,” 67.

Rehg’s Summary of Moor’s on Justice

A policy is just only if no rational impartial person would reject it as doing unjustifiable harm to the core human values of life, happiness, and autonomy, or the human rights that protect those values.

    — Rehg (2017, ch. 6)

Greater Burden Standard

It would be unreasonable to reject a principle because it imposed a burden on you when every alternative principle would impose much greater burdens on others [at least one person].

    — Gordon-Solmon (2019, 159)

Just Consequentialism Policy Selection Procedure

Procedure Outline¹

1. Moral Disclosure
2. Deliberation
3. Policy selection

1. Based on the outline by Rehg (2017, sec. 5.1).

1. Moral disclosure

A cyberpractice appears to us as morally dubious.

• To make a case that it is morally unacceptable and requires reform, we need to describe those features of the practice that call for closer moral evaluation. (The most obvious problems involve threats or harms to a core value or human right.) If the problem is real, then the harm must be one that any rational impartial person would not accept.
• We might also consider a policy problematic if its consequences are not beneficial to society as a whole, or if they lower overall aggregate utility.

2. Deliberation

Examine possible policy reforms from an impartial point of view, in order to see if those policies pass the deontological test for justice.

1. Does the policy under consideration “cause any unnecessary harms to individuals and groups,” that is, to their pursuit of core values, which any rational impartial person would reject? If so, then the policy is unjust and thus unethical.
2. Does the policy violate or undermine individual rights, responsibilities, duties, or the like? If it does so in a way that rational impartial persons would reject, then the policy is unjust.

3. Policy selection

In many cases, several policies will pass the test for justice. So we must select among these in light of their likely consequences, the various benefits and (non-critical) harms. Critical harms—harms to core values and basic rights—would be dealt with in the deliberation stage, so here we are examining lesser types of harm, such as reduced profits in some sector of the economy. Such harms may in some cases be ones that rational impartial persons would accept as justifiable, in light of other values at stake.

3. Policy selection (Continued)

Again, we have two steps in this stage:

1. Weigh the foreseeable or likely good and bad consequences of the policy under consideration.
2. Finally, clarify the disagreements that persist among rational impartial persons about the right ethical policy: is the disagreement over facts (e.g., which consequences are likely) or over the interpretation of values and rights? Moor is quite aware of that rational impartial persons can disagree about such matters.

Sources

Gordon-Solmon, Kerah. 2019. “Should Contractualists Decompose?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 47 (3): 259–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12146.

Moor, James H. 1999. “Just Consequentialism and Computing.” Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1): 61–65. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010078828842.

Rehg, William. 2017. Cogent Cyberethics. Unpublished manuscript.