Computer Ethics

DCE Stages IV and V
William Regh, S.J., Cogent Cyberethics, Chapter 7

Christopher L. Holland

Saint Louis University

October 10, 2024

Stage IV: Argument for Consistency/Inconsistency with Due Moral Regard

DCE Stages I–IV

We can divide Rehg’s method into two major parts.

  • Steps I–IV
  • Step V

Steps I-IV culminate with an argument for the consistency or inconsistency of a cyberpractice with Due Moral Regard.

DCE Stages I–IV (cont)

  • This argument is a response to the moral question raised in Stage I.
  • based on the stake-holder impact analysis in Stage II
  • that you clarify and contextualize in Stage III.
  1. Issue definition
  2. Shakeholder-impact analysis
  3. Judgment of values

DCE Stages I–IV (cont)

So in Stage IV (midterm question 5) you answer the moral question

(Qsubstantive)
Are CP(p) and its reasonably foreseeable impacts consistent with due moral regard for each stakeholder’s autonomous pursuit of values, and dependent satisfaction of needs?

with a yes or no answer to MQ(\(q\)), followed by with a cogent argument to support your answer.

Argument Form (part 1)

Your argument in Stage IV (midterm question 5) should begin using your findings in Steps I–II to support for one of the following claims.

For CP(\(p\))

  1. all the morally weighty impacts of \(p\) are on the side of benefits,
  2. all the morally weighty impacts of \(p\) are on the side of harms, or
  3. \(p\) has morally weighty benefits and harms.

This part of your argument should end with the exact wording of (i), (ii), or (iii).

Argument Form (part 2a)

If part 1 of your argument ended with (i) or (ii). Immediately proceed to the corresponding conclusion.

  1. All the morally weighty impacts of \(p\) are on the side of benefits, therefore \(p\) is consistent with due moral regard, and thus morally acceptable.
  2. All the morally weighty impacts of \(p\) are on the side of harms, therefore \(p\) is inconsistent with due moral regard, and thus morally unacceptable.

Argument Form (part 2b)

If part 1 of your argument ended with (iii). You will need to expand your argument by giving support for one of the following conclusions. Begin with your support, then state one of the conclusions below verbatim.

  • The moral benefits of \(p\) are great enough to justify the moral harm, and cannot be gained except through \(p\); or the harms are unavoidable anyhow; therefore \(p\) is consistent with due moral regard, and thus morally acceptable
  • The moral benefits of \(p\) cannot justify the moral harm, or do not require \(p\); therefore \(p\) is inconsistent with due moral regard, and thus morally unacceptable.

Stage V: Public Merits Assessment

A new question

Stages I-IV: (Qsub)
Are CP(\(p\)) and its reasonably foreseeable impacts consistent with due moral regard for each stakeholder’s autonomous pursuit of values, and dependent satisfaction of needs?
Stage V: (Qpm)
To what extent does my scrutiny of the relevant perspectives and public process of discourse on the issue warrant confidence that my answer to the substantive question (Qsub) enjoys public merits—i.e., that it can hold up as tenable across those relevant expert and stakeholder perspectives that qualify as reasonable and conscientious?

Public Merits and DCE

A dialogically responsible cyberethical evaluation of a given cyberpractice CP proves its public merits by winning reasonable acceptance across relevant perspectives on CP in well-structured networks of communication.

   — Rehg (2017, sec. 7.2)

Relevant perspective

A perspective has relevance insofar as

  • those holding that perspective qualify as conscientious stakeholders, or
  • those holding it have expertise on an empirical matter—e.g., regarding the actual or likely impacts of \(p\) on stakeholder values and needs—connected with the evaluation of \(p\)

   — Rehg (2017, sec. 7.2)

Reasonable

We seek contributions from participants who display dialogical virtues—an openness to reason, willingness to consider other points of view seriously and acknowledge valid points from a range of views. Conversely, to judge a particular participant as unreasonable is to say that that person is either so poorly informed on the matter or so utterly close minded and biased that his or her stance does not really tell us much about public merits.

   — Rehg (2018, sec. 8.2)

Well-structured communication networks

At this level, we want to know:

  • Whether venues of communication exist to distribute relevant information and arguments across mutually relevant publics
  • Whether widespread biases, prejudices, mutual suspicion, and the like block an argument’s travel across contexts, or foster the spread of dubious arguments
  • Whether misinformation has distorted how arguments travel

   — Rehg (2017, sec. 7.2)

Acceptance vs Agreement

One can accept a claim simply by not contesting it, or by acknowledging it as tenable, whereas agreement suggests that one personally believes the claim is true.

   — Rehg (2017, sec. 7.2)

Public Merits Judgments
(Rehg 2017, sec. 7.2)

High public merits (presumptively valid opinion):

Only one of the competing views enjoys wide public merits, finding strong support across all relevant perspectives: that view has presumptive objective validity for all parties, and the burden of argument is on dissent.

Mixed public merits (tenable opinion):

Reasonable stakeholders or experts within or across relevant perspectives persist in ongoing debate, adhering to opposing positions that neither side can convincingly discredit; each of the positions thus qualifies as publicly tenable, and may be reasonably held.

Low public merits (low-confidence opinion):

Our evaluation is reasonably rejected in most perspectives, making it difficult to consider it tenable; this is the fate of views that are left behind when one position widely prevails, or two or three views appear tenable.

Absence of public merits (no reasonable opinions):

A debate displays a degree of contention, incivility, or structural distortion that precludes confidence that any opinion on the matter qualifies as publicly reasonable.

Sources

Rehg, William. 2017. Cogent Cyberethics. Unpublished manuscript.
———. 2018. Cogent Cyberethics: Dialogically Responsible Evaluation of Emerging Digital Technologies. unpublished manuscript.